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Science, Politics, and Administrative 
Legitimacy 
Louis J. Virelli III* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Administrative agencies in the United States and other constitutional 
democracies around the world are continually faced with difficult questions 
about the legitimacy of their decisions.1  Each of these legitimacy questions 
in turn raises important second-order questions about how agencies should 
view their role within a constitutional democracy:  How closely should 
agency decisions reflect popular political will?  When and to what degree are 
deviations from popular opinion justified, and what measures should be taken 
to reduce the gap between regulators and the governed?  What other sources 
of information are critical to agency decision making, and how should those 
inputs be treated when they counsel against politically popular outcomes?  
This short Article seeks to direct closer attention to a particular legitimacy 
question and, in the process, to offer some additional areas for thought as well 
as some ideas on how to begin addressing that question. 
The specific legitimacy question of interest here is whether an agency 
decision may be made for political reasons2 that are at odds with the scientific 
inputs underlying that decision.  This is not to say that political considerations 
should not be a primary concern of administrative actors, or that a particular 
decision or category of decision is substantively incorrect or outside the pub-
lic interest because it does not comport with relevant scientific evidence.  
These statements may or may not be true, but in either event, they are not the 
subject of the present inquiry.  This Article focuses on a more basic question 
  
 * Leroy Highbaugh Sr. Research Chair and Professor of Law, Stetson Univer-
sity College of Law.  This essay was first presented at the Administrative Law Dis-
cussion Forum held at the Université du Luxembourg in June 2012.  I am grateful to 
Professors Russell Weaver and Herwig Hofmann for organizing the event, to the 
attendees for their helpful and thought-provoking comments, and to Stetson Univer-
sity College of Law for making my participation in the Forum possible.  Any errors 
are entirely my own. 
 1. According to Habermas, “‘[l]egitimacy means that there are good arguments 
for a political order’s claim to be recognized as right and just . . . .  Legitimacy means 
a political order’s worthiness to be recognized.’”  Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of 
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1285 (1984) (quoting 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178 (Tho-
mas McCarthy ed. & trans., Beacon Press 1979) (1976) (emphasis in original)). 
 2. For purposes of this discussion, I am using the phrase “political reasons” to 
mean any decisions driven by an agency’s exercise of its policymaking discretion, 
rather than by scientific or other more objective sources of information. 
1
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about the role of scientific information in administrative law—whether agen-
cies have a democratic obligation to incorporate scientific understanding into 
their policy decisions.  Part II highlights the phenomenon of “counter-
scientific” policy decisions; decisions that overlook otherwise uncontroverted 
scientific evidence in favor of political rationales.  Part III introduces the 
principles underlying administrative legitimacy and draws a distinction be-
tween legitimacy and statutory authorization.  Part IV then examines counter-
scientific policy decisions in light of those legitimacy principles and identifies 
several variables that affect legitimacy, including the nature of the agency and 
its mission and the type and form of the specific policy decision at issue. 
II. SOME TENSIONS BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
Three relatively recent examples from the United States illustrate the fo-
cus of this Article.  The first two involve decisions by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).  In 2005, the EPA decided not to promulgate addi-
tional regulations regarding the weed killer Atrazine.3  Just prior to the EPA’s 
decision, the European Union banned Atrazine on the basis of multiple scien-
tific studies concluding that Atrazine caused dangerous hormonal changes in 
test animals.4  Although the EPA claimed that there was uncertainty regarding 
Atrazine’s harmful effects, the EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel found that 
the studies relied on to support Atrazine’s continued use were fundamentally 
flawed.5  The EPA, however, remained steadfast in its decision not to further 
regulate Atrazine due to scientific uncertainty about its effects, despite sig-
nificant (and essentially uncontroverted) scientific evidence to the contrary.   
A more recent EPA example involved an attempt by the agency to lower 
the emissions threshold for ground-level ozone.6  The EPA Administrator 
suggested decreasing the threshold because, in the agency’s view, the existing 
standards “were not legally defensible given the scientific evidence” provided 
by the EPA’s scientific advisory committee.7  President Obama asked the 
  
 3. See Rick Weiss, ‘Data Quality’ Law Is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 16, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3733-2004Aug15 
.html (explaining that in the same month that the European Union banned Atrazine, 
“[T]he EPA decided to permit ongoing use in the United States with no new restric-
tions.”). 
 4. Id. (noting that the harmful effects of Atrazine “have been echoed by at least 
four other independent research teams in three countries.”). 
 5. See FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL, SAP REPORT NO. 2003-01, 
POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF ATRAZINE ON AMPHIBIANS 20-22 (2003), 
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/meetings/2003/june/junemeetingreport.pdf.  
 6. See Juliet Eilperin, Obama Pulls Back Proposed Smog Standards in Victory 
for Business, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-
09-02/national/35274851_1_ground-level-ozone-burdens-and-regulatory-uncertainty-
smog-standards. 
 7. Id. 
2
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Administrator to withdraw the proposed standards not due to scientific uncer-
tainty, but for economic reasons.8  In this instance, the conflict between poli-
tics and science was made explicit – rather than take issue with the credibility 
of the agency’s scientific conclusions, the President relied on political con-
siderations to support his decision to block the new standards.   
Finally, a recent and highly controversial decision by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides perhaps the most 
revealing example of the potential problems for administrative law when 
science and politics collide.  In 1999, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), a federal agency under the purview of HHS, approved  the morning-
after contraceptive pill “Plan B” as a prescription drug.9  Pursuant to an appli-
cation requesting that Plan B be approved for over-the-counter (OTC) as op-
posed to prescription sales, an FDA scientific advisory committee voted 23-4 
to approve OTC sales of Plan B in 2003.10  After several years of internal 
agency deliberations, including some public comment periods and a federal 
court decision,11 the FDA approved Plan B for OTC sales to consumers sev-
enteen years and older (and prescription sales to those younger than seven-
teen).12  In 2011, the FDA received a supplemental application to remove the 
prescription-only status of Plan B for consumers under seventeen.13  The 
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research reviewed the application 
and provided its scientific determination that Plan B is safe and effective for 
OTC use by “all females of child-bearing potential,” including those younger 
than seventeen.14  HHS Secretary Sebelius, however, rejected the FDA’s rec-
ommendation on the grounds that “the data . . . do not conclusively establish” 
  
 8. See id. 
 9. The Emergency Contraception Website, OFFICE OF POPULATION RES. & 
ASSOCIATION OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, http://ec.princeton.edu/pills 
/planbhistory.html (last updated June 14, 2012). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Press Release, FDA, Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Ham-
burg, M.D. on Plan B One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.fda.gov 
/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm282805.htm?utm_campaign=Google2&utm_source=fda
Search&utm_medium=website&utm_term=hamburg plan b statement&utm_content 
=1. 
 14. Id.  FDA Commissioner Hamburg went on to explain that: 
CDER carefully considered whether younger females were able to under-
stand how to use Plan B One-Step . . . [and] determined that the product 
was safe and effective in adolescent females, that adolescent females un-
derstood the product was not for routine use, and . . . would not protect 
them against sexually transmitted diseases.  Additionally, the data sup-
ported a finding that adolescent females could use Plan B One-Step prop-
erly without the intervention of a healthcare provider. 
Id. 
3
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that Plan B should be available OTC for “all girls of reproductive age.”15  The 
Secretary did not cite to any data inconsistent with the FDA’s conclusion, but 
instead simply stated that the data supporting Plan B’s safety and efficacy 
was inconclusive.16  The decision by HHS to override the FDA’s recommen-
dation was unprecedented17 and reflected a decision that, although explained 
at least in quasi-scientific terms, reflected what President Obama later called 
a “common sense” decision that would be consistent with the views of “most 
parents.”18  In short, HHS’ decision is a clear example of politics operating at 
the expense of science.19 
It is far easier to offer examples of what this Article calls “counter-
scientific” policy decisions – decisions that overlook otherwise uncontro-
verted scientific evidence in favor of political rationales – than to formulate a 
coherent set of parameters to define them.20  In some cases it may be difficult 
  
 15. Press Release, A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release, Sebelius 
statement], http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/12/20111207a.html. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Gardiner Harris, White House and the F.D.A. Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/health/policy/white-house-and-
fda-at-odds-on-regulatory-issues.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all (explaining that the 
Plan B decision by HHS was “the first time a cabinet member had ever publicly coun-
termanded a determination by the F.D.A.”). 
 18. David Jackson, Obama Defends Plan B Decision ‘As Father of Two Daugh-
ters’, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities 
/theoval/post/2011/12/Obama-No-involvement-in-Plan-B-decision-581152/1. 
 19. A District Court reviewing the Secretary’s decision came to the same conclu-
sion.  See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that HHS 
Secretary Sebelius’ denial of a citizen petition seeking to make Plan B available OTC 
to females of all ages was arbitrary and capricious). 
 20. One reaction to these examples may be that the problem I am describing is in 
reality a fiction; that scientific conclusions are often not “clear” and that politics and 
science frequently overlap in policy matters such that a charge of vagueness is often a 
fair explanation for why the prevailing scientific opinion may not be followed in a 
given instance.  While it is certainly true that science is not a panacea and often does 
not present binary choices, it is important to acknowledge that the presence of a scien-
tific dispute in a particular policy area is distinguishable from a policy decision ren-
dered in the face of overwhelming and consistent (even if ultimately flawed) scientific 
information.  As with the Atrazine and Plan B examples, when policymakers run 
afoul of the scientific consensus of their own scientists, let alone the broader scientific 
community, it presents a different dilemma within administrative law than when an 
agency is forced to weigh competing scientific propositions.  The end point is not 
whether the scientists are ultimately right or wrong, but whether the policymakers’ 
conduct comes into direct conflict with otherwise uncontroverted scientific inputs.  
Policymakers are often forced to make judgments in the face of competing scientific 
evidence, but that is a far cry from either ignoring the only credible scientific informa-
tion before them or substituting their own scientific judgment for that of the recog-
nized scientific experts. 
4
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to identify whether a particular policy decision includes an irreconcilable 
conflict between political and scientific justifications or just a more nuanced 
balancing between competing, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, con-
siderations.  There is also the problem that the best available scientific infor-
mation is frequently inconclusive or subject to valid scientific counterargu-
ments, such that it becomes virtually impossible to call any policy position 
truly counter-scientific.  Notwithstanding these complicating factors, there 
remains a category of cases – characterized by the above examples – that, at 
minimum, reveals that direct conflicts between science and politics exist in 
administrative law and that such impasses are often resolved in favor of po-
litical, rather than scientific, factors.  The question, then, is whether these 
counter-scientific cases raise issues of administrative legitimacy. 
III. LEGITIMACY 
Conflicts between politics and science raise a number of normative 
questions that have been the topic of frequent and thorough scholarly debate.  
A topic that has thus far been under-appreciated is the effect of such conflict 
on the democratic legitimacy of an agency’s policy decision.  For sure, many 
agencies are constrained by statutory requirements that they consider scien-
tific information in certain policy areas, but the legitimacy question is of a 
higher order of magnitude.21  Because the administrative state is not explicitly 
provided for in the Constitution,22 administrative law is under constant pres-
sure to justify agency rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication in a system 
where all three of those powers are expressly assigned to coordinate branches 
of government.23   
The principles of administrative legitimacy most directly implicated in 
conflicts between science and politics are expertise, accountability, and effi-
ciency.24  Agency expertise is a foundational principle of administrative 
  
 21. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining why congressional 
approval is not synonymous with democratic legitimacy). 
 22. The closest constitutional reference to administrative entities is the language 
about “executive Departments” in Article II: “The President . . . may require the 
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
art II § 2, cl. 1. 
 23. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) (“From the 
birth of the administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory gov-
ernment as the legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.  That is, we have 
sought to reconcile the administrative state with a constitutional structure that reserves 
important policy decisions for elected officials and not for appointed bureaucrats.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: 
Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (2003) (“[W]e find several elements and criteria that are 
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law.25  It reflects the often highly specific and technical mission of adminis-
trative agencies and the corresponding need for government officials with 
compartmentalized knowledge and experience in their delegated policymak-
ing arena.26  Agency expertise reached perhaps its legitimizing peak as part of 
the technocratic model of administrative law that arose during the New 
Deal,27 yet it remains significant under other, more current models of admini-
stration (like public choice theory and civic republicanism) that depend on 
reliable inputs to inform the resolution of competing interests and viewpoints 
in policymaking.28  This is especially true at the intersection of science and 
public policy, where the sound scientific inputs that result from expert agen-
cies are critical to protecting the quality of the policymaking process. 
Accountability, which includes as a prerequisite transparency,29 is also 
of paramount importance for administrative legitimacy.  Accountability refers 
to the public’s ability to retain control over its government – including its 
administrative institutions – by judging public actors on their performance in 
office.  In order for the public to make that judgment in the administrative 
  
held to contribute to the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority . . . .  [S]uch 
criteria are transparency and efficiency of government (or more broadly, public 
authority), and actions and accountability . . . .  Finally, we may add expertise as a 
factor that can contribute to the acceptability of acts of public authorities.”). 
 25. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 99-100 (1994) (“To be sure, many insist on technocratic ration-
ality . . . .  This is an enduring theme in administrative law . . . .  [T]he absence of 
expertise, or the distortion of expert judgment . . . is an important obstacle to a well-
functioning system of regulatory law.”). 
 26. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) (“With the rise 
of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant . . . .”). 
 27. See LANDIS, supra, at 26 (“With the rise of regulation, the need for expert-
ness became dominant . . . .”); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1252 (1986) (“As in its initial phase, the New 
Deal continued its propensity to address particularized areas of unrest through regula-
tion by experts . . . .”); id. at 1266 (“With the final legitimation of the New Deal came 
the acceptance of a central precept of public administration: faith in the ability of 
experts to develop effective solutions . . . .”). 
 28. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic 
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 
(1992). 
 29. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 187 (1990) (“The 
principle of political accountability has an unmistakable foundation in Article I of the 
Constitution, and it is an overriding structural commitment of the document.  The 
principle has foundations as well in assessments of institutional performance.  At the 
same time, it operates to counteract characteristic failures in the regulatory process.”); 
Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 387, 428 (2003) (noting that transparency is a “precondition” to 
accountability, as “[t]ransparency . . . facilitate[s] accountability because citizens need 
information to know when to hold which leaders accountable for what decisions.”). 
6
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context, it must be privy to an agency’s explanations for its exercise of 
authority.30  Transparency is thus a precondition to accountability because it 
is necessary for the public to have access to the information upon which ad-
ministrators base their judgments in order to monitor the conduct and compe-
tency of those administrators.  Where scientific information is involved, the 
need for accountability and transparency is even greater, as the public and 
their political representatives require the relevant technical inputs in order to 
properly understand the agency’s rationale for its policy position.  Without 
disclosure of the scientific underpinnings of agency decisions, those decisions 
are largely untestable by anyone other than experts in the field, which is too 
narrow an audience to facilitate the robust check on agency action that ac-
countability and transparency seek to provide.31 
The efficiency principle acknowledges the importance of responsive, 
timely government.32  It is an important feature of administrative law gener-
ally and of decisions based on scientific information in particular, as scientific 
inputs to policy questions are often costly and aimed at addressing time-
sensitive issues.33  Scientific inputs can thus hinder the efficiency of agency 
policymaking.  Any inefficiency, however, is often seen as overcome by the 
  
 30. Mark Fenster, The Opacity Of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 899 
(2006) (“The most significant consequences [of government transparency] flow from 
the public’s increased ability to monitor government activity and hold officials . . . 
accountable for their actions.”); see also Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Skelley Wright, J.) (describing Con-
gress’ purpose in enacting the Sunshine Act to “enhance citizen confidence in 
government, encourage higher quality work by government officials, stimulate 
well-informed public debate about government programs and policies, and pro-
mote cooperation between citizens and government. In short, it sought to make 
government more fully accountable to the people.”).  But see Edward Rubin, The 
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 
(2005) (challenging popular conceptions about political accountability). 
 31. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 23, at 499 (describing accountability in gen-
eral as “requir[ing] elected officials to make policy decisions because they are subject 
to the check of the people if they do not discharge their duties in a sufficiently public-
regarding and otherwise rational, predictable, and fair manner”); see also Rebecca L. 
Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 565-71 
(1998) (same).  In the administrative context, this typically involves voters expressing 
their dissatisfaction with elected officials who appointed or otherwise supported par-
ticular administrators or agencies. 
 32. Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at 
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. 
REV. 485, 516 (1970) (“The goal of efficiency needs no explanation or defense.  If it 
cannot be considered an ultimate concern of administrative law that tasks be accom-
plished with the minimum expenditure of time and resources, it is nevertheless a mat-
ter of large importance.”). 
 33. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS 
POLICYMAKERS 77-78 (1990). 
7
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benefits to the agency of having scientific information to support its policy 
determination.34  Administrative law must be attentive to these concerns in 
order to maintain its legitimacy within a democracy. 
Another potentially legitimizing force for administrative agencies is 
congressional approval of agency action.  At first glance, statutory authoriza-
tion appears to answer the legitimacy question as a matter of course, as en-
dorsement by a democratically representative legislature offers at least some 
democratic pedigree.  Closer examination, however, reveals that statutory 
authorization and democratic legitimacy are not necessarily coextensive.  
Assuming the factors discussed here – expertise, accountability, and effi-
ciency – are indeed relevant to legitimacy, it is quite possible that Congress 
could assign certain prerogatives to agencies that the agency (as constructed 
by Congress) is neither expert, accountable, nor particularly efficient in pur-
suing.  Conversely, Congress could prohibit agencies from pursuing ends for 
which the agency is in fact expert, accountable, and efficient.  The legality of 
agency decisions is thus not inextricably intertwined with their legitimacy. 
Existing principles of administrative law, especially those pertaining to 
judicial review of agency action, support the conclusion that legitimacy and 
congressional approval are not necessarily identical.  The high degrees of 
judicial deference afforded to agency factual determinations, policy decisions, 
and interpretations of an agency’s own enabling statute and regulations all 
point to the fact that agencies may act in areas and in ways not specifically 
delineated by Congress.35  Unless all of these well-established gap-filling 
measures by agencies are illegitimate, congressional approval and democratic 
legitimacy cannot be precise synonyms.  Finally, it is worthwhile to think of 
legitimacy as related to, but not entirely synonymous with, existing legislative 
guidelines because doing so permits a broader and more thorough theoretical 
view of the legitimacy of counter-scientific agency decisions. 
  
 34. Reliance on the “best available science” is becoming a critical principle of 
our administrative government.  See Exec.	  Order	  13563	  (Jan.	  18,	  2011)	  “Our	  regu-­‐latory	   system	  must	   .	   .	   .	   be	   based	   on	   the	   best	   available	   science.”);	   see	   also FDA 
STAFF MANUAL GUIDES VOLUME VI–AGENCY PROGRAM DIRECTIVES 1 (2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuide
s/UCM290169.pdf (“Access to reliable scientific and technological information is 
central to FDA’s mission . . .”). 
 35. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2) (2006) (outlining the highly deferential “arbi-
trary and capricious” and “substantial evidence” tests for evaluating agency fact and 
policy determinations); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (estab-
lishing standards for judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regula-
tions); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 
(1984) (establishing standards for judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of 
its enabling statute). 
8
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IV. SCIENCE, POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY 
The foregoing discussion about administrative legitimacy and the poten-
tial conflicts between science and politics in agency decision making high-
lights the ultimate question of interest here: are counter-scientific agency 
decisions legitimate?  One way to begin answering that question is to con-
sider the effect of conflicts between science and politics in light of each of the 
animating principles of administrative legitimacy discussed above—
expertise, accountability, and efficiency. 
A.  Expertise 
Counter-scientific agency decisions have potentially serious negative 
consequences for agency expertise.  If an agency assembles a collection of 
scientific information in pursuit of a policy decision and then seemingly ig-
nores or otherwise disregards that information, any claim by the agency that it 
is acting as a scientific expert necessarily fails.  This failure could in turn 
have significant consequences for the legitimacy of that agency’s ultimate 
policy decision.  At minimum, it begs the question of what entitles an un-
elected administrator to render binding policy decisions when he or she fails 
to rely on relevant information that is not only within an area of agency profi-
ciency, but also is likely unavailable to, or beyond the comprehension of, 
elected officials. 
There are some important variables to consider when contemplating a 
topic as broad as agency expertise.  First, it is certainly possible that an 
agency offers expertise in more than one area, including in areas that are not 
highly technical or scientific.  For instance, an administrator who acted in 
contravention of the best available scientific information due to his or her 
understanding of the national political climate or of some other competing 
public interests may be demonstrating a different sort of expertise that is just 
as legitimizing as the agency’s expertise in a specific scientific discipline.  
This example is reflected in the EPA’s recent decision not to pursue new, 
more restrictive ground-level ozone standards due to the difficult economic 
conditions in the country at the time.36  Although the EPA’s decision (made 
with the assistance of the President) was rightly controversial because it was 
inconsistent with clear scientific evidence supporting more restrictive stan-
dards, it is quite another matter to say that the EPA acted so far outside its 
area of expertise by choosing to wait to promulgate new standards as to 
threaten the legitimacy of that decision.37   
  
 36. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
 37. That is not to say that the EPA’s decision to forego further ozone regulation 
for economic/political reasons was within its institutional expertise.  It may well be 
that the EPA is not sufficiently qualified in the economic impacts of its ozone deci-
sion to legitimize that decision.  The purpose of this exercise is not to establish the 
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Another related variable in the expertise calculus is the nature of the 
agency and its mission.  The scope of agency expertise can be determined 
“objectively” by reference to the agency’s statutorily-assigned mission and 
responsibilities, or “subjectively” through an account of the agency’s histori-
cal practices, the agency’s perceived role, or its reputation.  Agencies more 
likely to be thought of as properly “scientific” rather than “political,” such as 
NASA or perhaps the FDA, will have to carry a higher scientific burden in 
order to maintain the legitimacy that comes with expertise.  By contrast, 
agencies with more fluid statutory mandates or cultural identities, like the 
State Department or the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
will be better able to claim fidelity to their role as experts even when they 
make decisions that are scientifically indefensible.   
The last variable worth mentioning in relation to agency expertise is the 
agency’s explanation of its treatment of scientific information.  Independent 
of its effect on accountability,38 the way an agency chooses to explain its 
departure from scientific data could also bear on agency expertise.  Where an 
agency only explains a counter-scientific decision in scientific terms – such 
as when the HHS Secretary described the significant and otherwise uncontro-
verted scientific evidence supporting OTC sales of Plan B to all women of 
child-bearing age as inconclusive39 – its status as an expert is badly dimin-
ished because its only claim to expertise over the subject matter is scientific, 
and its decision does not reflect sound scientific reasoning.   
On the other hand, where an agency cites non-scientific reasons for de-
parting from its scientific inputs, especially where the stated non-scientific 
reasons themselves fall within another area of agency knowledge and experi-
ence, the agency can still be seen as filling its role as an expert.  This phe-
nomenon is exemplified by the EPA’s decision to forego additional ground 
ozone regulations for economic or political reasons.40  To the extent the EPA 
can claim that it has some responsibility to reflect publicly-accepted norms 
and attitudes, a decision to delay ozone restrictions until the economy could 
further recover is far less likely to constitute a derogation of the agency’s 
  
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a specific administrative determination.  Instead, the 
EPA ground ozone example is offered as a vehicle for thinking about how to evaluate 
administrative expertise with regard to counter-scientific decisions.  It demonstrates 
how non-scientific explanations or motivations for such decisions may still implicate 
agency expertise in ways that support treating those decisions as democratically le-
gitimate. 
It is also quite possible that the EPA’s decision to forego ground ozone regulation for 
economic/political reasons is prohibited by statute.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).  
For reasons articulated in Part III, supra, the fact that agency action violates applica-
ble statutes may render that action invalid as a matter of law, but does not necessarily 
mean that action is democratically illegitimate.  
 38. For a discussion of agency accountability and legitimacy, see infra Part IV.B.  
 39. See Press Release, Sebelius statement, supra note 15. 
 40. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.  
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expert duties than a decision to ignore scientific data for (almost entirely un-
supported) scientific reasons. 
This expertise analysis admittedly raises more questions than it answers.  
The questions it does raise, however, are important ones that are often over-
looked in evaluating controversial agency decisions involving scientific ques-
tions.  Thinking of agency decisions in terms of the agencies’ role as experts 
provides a useful framework for evaluating those decisions.  Variables such 
as the scope of a particular agency’s expertise, the nature of that agency and 
its role in government, and the agency’s own claims as to how it is exercising 
its expertise all contribute to what will inevitably be case-specific evaluations 
of counter-scientific agency decisions. 
B.  Accountability 
The relationship between agency accountability and counter-scientific 
policy decisions is far more fact-dependent than the corresponding analysis 
regarding expertise.  There are at least three different ways in which an 
agency could issue a policy decision that runs counter to the prevailing scien-
tific inputs, and each of those ways has different consequences for agency 
accountability.   
One approach by the agency would be to simply say nothing about why 
its decision did not appear to acknowledge the available scientific informa-
tion.  Beyond the fact that this approach would likely run afoul of procedural 
requirements for administrative policymaking, at least in the United States,41 
it would seriously hinder the public’s ability to evaluate the nature and quality 
of the agency’s decision, the very core of administrative transparency and 
accountability.42 
Another potential course by the agency would be to support its conclu-
sion with a scientific critique of, or counterpoint to, the technical information 
before it.  Where this approach is done convincingly, such as to highlight an 
area of genuine scientific uncertainty or debate, it would enhance account-
ability.  It would provide the public with access to all of the scientific data 
and reasoning employed by the agency and, in turn, permit a more robust 
evaluation of the agency’s decision.  This course is the least interesting to the 
present discussion, however, because the availability of valid scientific coun-
terarguments renders the agency’s decision far less likely to qualify as 
counter-scientific. 
  
 41. This is certainly the case under the Administrative Procedure Act in the 
United States.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring new regulations to be accompanied 
by a “concise general statement of their basis and purpose”); United States v. N.S. 
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring an agency to divulge 
scientific information relied upon by the agency in promulgating regulations). 
 42. See supra Part III (discussing the principles of transparency and accountabil-
ity in administrative law). 
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A different outcome adheres, however, where an agency’s scientific 
counterargument is less satisfying.  For instance, HHS Secretary Sebelius’ 
recent refusal to permit OTC sales of Plan B to all women of child-bearing 
age relied heavily on the position that the FDA’s scientific information de-
scribing such sales as safe and effective was “inconclusive,” despite the lack 
of any affirmative scientific evidence to that effect.43  This use of scientific 
“reasoning” to justify a policy decision in conflict with the relevant scientific 
data does not enhance agency accountability, but in fact hinders it.  It is far 
more difficult to evaluate the substantive merits of a purportedly scientific 
conclusion by an agency when that conclusion lacks scientific support.  The 
public is unable to balance the competing scientific claims because only one 
is affirmatively supported, and any ulterior motives by the agency remain 
clouded by the agency’s proffer of an exclusively scientific justification.   
The problem of hidden agency motives arises in situations like the 
EPA’s Atrazine example,44 where ostensibly valid, concrete evidence is cited 
in support of the agency’s position, but that evidence turns out to be unreli-
able because it comes from interested parties and is subject to significant 
criticism by independent scientific peer reviewers.  Whereas this example 
does not prevent scientific accountability, as the public can (at least theoreti-
cally) gather all of the proffered scientific evidence and seek to reach its own 
conclusion about the agency’s judgment,45 it does nothing to alleviate the 
agency’s obfuscation of its other motivations for its policy decisions, thus 
leading to a loss in accountability generally.  In sum, the effect of a scientific 
counterpoint on agency accountability is heavily dependent on the quality of 
that counterpoint, both in terms of the amount of information provided and its 
scientific pedigree.  
A third approach would be for an agency to provide a detailed non-
scientific (e.g. political) explanation of its reason for running afoul of the 
relevant scientific inputs.46  This approach – exemplified by the EPA’s 
ground-level ozone example47 – has some potentially significant benefits for 
agency accountability, as it could provide the most transparent account of the 
  
 43. Press Release, Sebelius statement, supra note 15. 
 44. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
 45. Another important issue that is not directly implicated here is whether the 
public is qualified, under any circumstances, to hold agencies accountable for highly 
technical decisions, regardless of the amount and scope of information made available 
to them. 
 46. Disclosure by agencies of their political reasons for taking certain actions has 
become a widely discussed and popular approach among notable commentators like 
Professors Nina Mendelson and Kathryn Watts.  See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); 
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Re-
view, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009). 
 47. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.   
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agency’s thought process and reasoning.48  The difficulty is one of substance, 
rather than process.  While divulging its non-scientific reasons would provide 
the public with a true account of the agency’s deliberative process, the inher-
ent difficulty in comparing the relative value between scientific and non-
scientific justifications may do far less to assist the public in evaluating the 
ultimate quality of that decision.  In either event, offering political reasons for 
a policy decision is generally a net gain to agency transparency, especially 
when the alternatives are either no scientific explanations or incomplete ones. 
While it is of little surprise that more information tends to better pro-
mote agency accountability, a more detailed treatment of accountability in the 
case of counter-scientific agency decisions reveals the significance of not 
only the quantity but also the nature of that information for administrative 
legitimacy. 
C.  Efficiency 
Efficiency is another principle of administrative legitimacy impacted by 
counter-scientific agency decisions.  At first glance, it would appear that the 
time and money spent developing the relevant scientific inputs are necessarily 
wasted in a policymaking process that does not meaningfully consider that 
scientific information.  This situation is represented in the Atrazine and Plan 
B examples above,49 where scientific information was overlooked or disre-
garded on either nonexistent or fundamentally flawed scientific grounds.  In 
these cases, counter-scientific agency decisions are by definition inefficient.   
A closer look, however, shows that not all counter-scientific decisions 
are the products of inefficient policymaking; in some instances, the efficiency 
calculus may depend on some of the same variables as expertise and account-
ability.  Counter-scientific decisions may be considered efficient, for exam-
ple, where the relevant technical inputs are the subject of genuine scientific 
debate and the agency commits to developing data on both sides of the scien-
tific question.  In that instance, the science is not wasted but is an active and 
informative part of the larger policy inquiry.  Counter-scientific decisions 
may also be efficient when the agency’s reason for its counter-scientific deci-
sion is political.  In that case, which is represented by the EPA’s ground-level 
ozone decision, the relevant scientific information can be a useful backdrop 
for formulating the political reasons for a decision, even if they are inconsis-
tent with that scientific data.  
 
  
 48. While the question would still linger as to whether a particular political rea-
son is itself legitimate, the transparent statement of that reason would likely permit 
courts to address such a second-order legitimacy question through a case-by-case 
application of something like an arbitrariness standard.  See, e.g., Mendelson, supra 
note 46, at 1171-75. 
 49. See supra notes 3-5, 9-18 and accompanying text. 
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This result is especially true where the agency’s mission is not entirely 
scientific.  Agencies with greater non-scientific roles or responsibilities will 
more likely be seen as using science efficiently even where the agency ulti-
mately decides to pursue a counter-scientific outcome.  In short, although the 
investment in scientific data may often be lost in a counter-scientific policy 
decision, there are other factors that may affect an agency’s efficiency, and 
thus its legitimacy, in significant ways. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Science and politics often interact successfully in administrative law.  
Potential problems arise, however, when these two valuable sources of infor-
mation for policymakers are at odds with one another.  In cases when the two 
become irreconcilable, it becomes worthwhile to ask about the viability of an 
administrative decision that chooses to overlook or otherwise disregard rele-
vant scientific evidence.  Under what circumstances may political decisions 
made by unelected administrators in the face of contrary scientific data be 
considered illegitimate in a constitutional democracy?  While the question is 
rather straightforward, the answer – especially one that seeks to provide a 
generalized formula for determining legitimacy – is, at best, elusive.  For that 
reason, the foregoing was designed as more of an analytical exercise than a 
normative prescription.   
Asking about legitimacy in terms of some of the concept’s animating 
principles such as expertise, accountability, and efficiency does, however, 
offer some insight into the challenges posed by counter-scientific policy deci-
sions.  First, it offers an opportunity to reorganize and reevaluate those chal-
lenges in familiar terms and to more easily identify some of the critical vari-
ables in the analysis.  The two most significant variables that emerge are the 
nature of the agency as well as the type and form of the specific policy deci-
sion at issue.  Considerations of expertise and efficiency highlight the impor-
tance of an agency’s statutorily assigned and publicly accepted areas of 
knowledge, such that the impact on both principles is, at least in part, a func-
tion of that agency’s governing mission and responsibilities.  Expertise and 
accountability stress the significance of an agency’s choice and articulation of 
its reasons for its policy decision, and efficiency reinforces the value of thor-
oughness and clarity in an agency’s deliberative process.   
In addition to reframing counter-scientific policymaking, some very 
general trends may also be drawn from this exercise.  Unsupported scientific 
explanations for counter-scientific policy decisions, for instance, appear to 
lead to significant expertise, accountability, and efficiency problems, whereas 
purely political (i.e. non-scientific) explanations for those same decisions fare 
better in terms of agency accountability and efficiency and no worse in their 
effect on expertise.  When considered in light of the above variables, this 
insight can serve as a useful starting point in a more rigorous evaluation of 
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counter-scientific agency decisions that could have powerful implications for 
policymaking as well as for administrative legitimacy in general. 
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